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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Applying An Incorrect Legal Standard To The Question Of
Whether The Exigent Circumstances Warrant Exception Applied
The district court held that, for the exigent circumstances exception to apply,
officers had to have “more” than probable cause to believe tainted marijuana was being
held, distributed and used by Sessions, such as “hearing a person moaning or in distress,
observing … a non-responsive person, being told that someone was complaining of a
symptom of paralysis, seeing someone smoking marijuana believed to be tainted, etc.” (R.,
p. 77 (cited Appellant’s brief, p. 2).) The exigent circumstances exception “applies when
‘the exigencies of the situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a
warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Kentucky v.
King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011) (internal quotations and brackets omitted). Making sure
that the tainted marijuana paralyzing its users was not further distributed or used was a
compelling need without evidence that there were more victims. (Appellant’s brief, pp.,
4-7.)
On appeal Sessions mostly ignores or misrepresents the state’s arguments. First,
he claims that because the district court cited and quoted exigent circumstances cases, the
court necessarily applied a correct legal standard.

(Respondent’s brief, pp. 8-10.)

However, that would be true only if the cited cases supported the district court’s analysis.
There is simply nothing in Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006), or State v. Smith,
159 Idaho 865, 367 P.3d 260 (Ct. App. 2016), that supports the district court’s requirement
of evidence of persons currently in distress or currently consuming the tainted marijuana.
Neither of those cases, for example, would prevent officers from acting to prevent harm,
or limit exigent circumstances to addressing harm that is in progress. By requiring that the
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harm be underway (at minimum the tainted marijuana is in fact being consumed at that
moment), rather than allowing officers to prevent the threat of that harm (by entering and
seizing the marijuana before it can be used or distributed), the district court applied an
incorrect legal standard.
The district court is not inoculated against reversal by merely articulating the
correct legal standard. “Constitutional issues are purely questions of law over which this
Court exercises free review.” State v. Forbes, 152 Idaho 849, 851, 275 P.3d 864, 866
(2012). Thus, it is this Court’s application of the legal standards to the facts that is
controlling of this appeal.
Second, Sessions addresses the state’s argument regarding the district court’s
finding that there was sufficient exigency to justify securing the home while they sought a
warrant only “[t]o the extent the State is attempting to reassert the inevitable discovery
doctrine.” (Respondent’s brief, p. 11. 1) The state did not make an inevitable discovery
argument to any extent, so Sessions’ countering of the nonexistent argument is irrelevant.
(Appellant’s brief, p. 6.) The district court concluded that the threat of harm could be
addressed by securing the premises and then securing a search warrant. However, if the
threat of injury justified securing the premises, that is the epitome of exigent
circumstances. Indeed, once exigent circumstances justify securing the premises, as the
district court here found they did, the evidence thus found is properly seized in plain view
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Sessions also argues that the district court’s finding that exigent circumstances justified
the police entering and securing the residence, but not searching for marijuana therein until
a warrant had been obtained, was erroneous and dicta. (Respondent’s brief, p. 9, n.2.)
What is telling is that Sessions tacitly admits the district court’s finding that exigent
circumstances justified entry to secure the residence is incompatible with its finding that
there were no exigent circumstances.
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and is not suppressible. --King, 563 U.S. at 462-63 (evidence properly seized after home
entry justified by exigent circumstances of preventing destruction of evidence). The
district court’s “seize the premises then secure a warrant” standard is incompatible with
this precedent allowing seizure of evidence once exigent circumstances justified the home
entry.
Third, Sessions argues that the state is advocating an exigency standard whereby
“warrantless entries would be justified whenever officers had probable cause to believe
that an individual possessed any drug (or any thing) merely capable of causing harm,
without any reason to believe the harm was imminent.” (Respondent’s brief, p. 10.) The
state is not advocating any such a standard. Although the use of illegal drugs causes harm,
especially the prolonged use, there is nothing exigent about the potential harms of
addiction, cognition loss, or other general deleterious effects of abusing untainted drugs.
Ordinarily a single use of marijuana does not cause imminent and serious injury. However,
a single use of the tainted marijuana in this case would cause imminent and serious injury—
paralysis. Thus, the only way to prevent imminent serious injury was to seize the marijuana
before it could be distributed or used. Sessions’ arguments, aimed at strawmen, do not
show a lack of error by the district court.
Sessions does make one legitimate argument: “Even assuming the marijuana was
actually tainted so that anyone who used it might suffer adverse effects, it could only cause
harm if actually ingested.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 10.) This is the crux of the application of
the exigent circumstances exception in this case.

According to the district court,

circumstances were exigent only if the marijuana had been actually ingested or was in the
current process of being actually ingested. No threat of future ingestion or distribution
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taking the tainted marijuana beyond the police’s ability to prevent harm would qualify as
an exigency.
The exigent circumstances exception is not so limited, however. Requiring the
injury to have already happened or to be in the process of happening was contrary to the
applicable standard, which allows police to act on the threat of imminent injury. See
Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403 (“One exigency obviating the requirement of a warrant is
the need to assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury.”
(emphasis added)); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978) (“The need to protect or
preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal
absent an exigency or emergency.” (emphasis added, internal quotations omitted)); State
v. Araiza, 147 Idaho 371, 375, 209 P.3d 668, 672 (Ct. App. 2009) (“law enforcement
officers may enter a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured
occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury” (emphasis added)).
An example of the application of this concept is found in State v. Smith, 144 Idaho
482, 163 P.3d 1194 (2007). In that case the fire department was dispatched to an old house.
Id. at 484, 163 P.3d at 1196. At the scene they found people who had just extinguished a
flaming couch in the driveway. Id. Although “there were no visible flames or smoke
coming from the house,” a soot trail and other signs indicated the couch fire had started in
an apartment in the house. Id. Firefighters and police officers entered the apartment to
ascertain if there was an ongoing risk of fire. Id. They found no fire, but did find a
marijuana-grow operation. Id. at 484-85, 163 P.3d at 1196-97.
This Court rejected the argument that entry into the apartment was not justified by
the exigent circumstances exception. The Court noted that entry into a burning building is
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justified by exigency. Id. at 486, 163 P.3d at 1198. “The exigency in this case was a threat
of fire rather than an actual fire, but the principle is the same.” Id. (emphasis added). A
fire can smolder “in walls or floors or under carpets for hours or days after something else
has been on fire in an apartment,” which created the exigency of determining if there was
such a risk. Id.
In Smith a threat of fire that could break out soon or maybe not for days was an
exigency justifying immediate entry. The mere possibility that something bad would not
happen in the time to secure a warrant did not disprove the exigency. Likewise in this case,
the absence of evidence there were paralysis victims in the house did not disprove the
exigency. The exigency of preventing distribution or use of the tainted marijuana made
the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search was objectively
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse or to vacate, and to remand.
DATED this 18th day of April, 2019.

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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